KOREA (NORTH)

Comiled from the August 2004 Background Note and supplemented with additional information from the State Department and the editors of this volume. See the introduction to this set for explanatory notes.

Official Name:
Democratic People's Republic of Korea

PROFILE

Geography

Area: 120,410 sq. km. (47,000 sq. mi.), about the size of Mississippi.

Cities: Capital—pyongyang. Other cities—Hamhung, Chongjin, Wonsan, Nampo, and Kaesong.

Terrain: About 80% of land area is moderately high mountains separated by deep, narrow valleys and small, cultivated plains. The remainder is lowland plains covering small, scattered areas.

Climate: Long, cold, dry winters; short, hot, humid, summers.

people

Nationality: Noun and adjective—Korean(s).

population: (2004) 22.7 million.

Annual growth rate: About +0.98%.

population: (2003) 22.5 million.

Annual growth rate: About −0.03%.

Ethnic groups: Korean; small Chinese and Japanese populations.

Religions: Buddhism, Shamanism, Chongdogyo, Christian; religious activities have been virtually nonexistent since 1945.

Language: Korean.

Education: Years compulsory—11. Attendance—3 million (primary, 1.5 million; secondary, 1.2 million; tertiary, 0.3 million). Literacy—99%.

Health: (1998) Medical treatment is free; one doctor for every 700 inhabitants; one hospital bed for every 350. Infant mortality rate—25/1,000. Life expectancy—males 68 yrs., females 74 yrs.

Government

Type: Highly centralized communist state.

Independence: September 9, 1948.

Constitution: 1948; 1972, revised in 1992.

Branches: Executive—president of the presidium of the Supreme people's Assembly (chief of state); Chairman of the National Defense Commission (head of government). Legislative—Supreme people's Assembly. Judicial—Supreme Court; provincial, city, county, and military courts.

Administrative subdivisions: Nine provinces; four province-level municipalities (pyongyang, Kaesong, Chongjin, Nampo); one free trade zone (Najin-Sonbong FTZ).

political parties: Korean Workers' party (communist).

Suffrage: Universal at 17.

Economy

GDp: (2002) $22 billion (purchasing power parity); 30% agriculture, 34% industry, 36% services.

per capita GDp: (2002) $1000 purchasing power parity.

Agriculture: products—rice, corn, potatoes, soybeans, pulses; cattle, pigs, eggs.

Mining and manufacturing: Types—military products; machine building, electric power, chemicals; mining (coal, iron ore, etc.), metallurgy; textiles, food processing; tourism.

Trade: (2001) Exports—__BODY__.044 billion; minerals, metallurgical products, manufactures; textiles, fishery products. Imports—$2.042 billion: petroleum, coking coal, machinery and equipment; textiles, grain. Major partners—China (39.7%), Thailand (14.6%), Japan (11.2%), Germany (7.6%), R.O.K (6.2%). *In most cases, the figures used above are estimates based upon incomplete data and projections.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA

U.S. Support for North-South Dialogue and Reunification

The United States supports the peaceful reunification of Korea—divided following World War II—on terms acceptable to the Korean people and recognizes that the future of the Korean peninsula is primarily a matter for them to decide. The U.S. believes that a constructive and serious dialogue between the authorities of North and South Korea (Republic of Korea, R.O.K.) is necessary to resolve the issues on the peninsula.

On his inauguration in February 1998, R.O.K. president Kim Dae-jung enunciated a new policy of engagement with North Korea dubbed "the Sunshine policy." The policy had three fundamental principles: no tolerance of provocations from the North, no intention to absorb the North, and the separation of political cooperation from economic cooperation. private sector overtures would be based on commercial and humanitarian considerations. The use of government resources would entail reciprocity. This policy eventually set the stage for the first (and only) inter-Korean summit, held in pyongyang June 13-15, 2000. The summit produced a Joint Declaration noting that the two governments "have agreed to resolve the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people…."

Following his election and inauguration in February 2003, R.O.K. president Roh Moo-hyun promised to continue his predecessor's policy of engagement with the North, though he abandoned the name "Sunshine policy." The U.S. supports president Roh's engagement policy and ongoing North-South dialogue. Since the June 2000 summit, the two Koreas have held regular ministerial-level meetings to discuss North-South political and economic relations. One meeting of defense ministers was held on Cheju Island (South Korea) in 2000. While North Korea agreed in 2000 that North Korean National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il would visit South Korea in the near future, that visit has yet to take place.

North-South reconciliation has also involved a series of reunion meetings between members of families divided during the Korean War. Major economic reunification projects have included the re-establishment of road and rail links across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and agreement to set up a joint North-South industrial park near the North Korean city of Kaesong.

Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula

North Korea joined the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state in 1985, and North and South Korean talks begun in 1990 resulted in a 1992 Denuclearization Statement. However, lack of progress in developing and implementing an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the inspection of the North's nuclear facilities led to North Korea's March 1993 announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT. A UN Security Council Resolution in May 1993 urged the D.p.R.K. to cooperate with the IAEA and to implement the 1992 North-South Denuclearization Statement. It also urged all member states to encourage the D.p.R.K. to respond positively to this resolution and to facilitate a solution of the nuclear issue.

U.S.-D.p.R.K. talks beginning in June 1993 led, in October 1994, to the conclusion of the U.S.-D.p.R.K. Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework called for the following steps:

North Korea agreed to freeze its existing nuclear program to be monitored by the IAEA.
Both sides agreed to cooperate to replace the D.p.R.K.'s graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants, to be financed and supplied by an international consortium (later identified as the Korean peninsula Energy Development Organization or KEDO).
The U.S. and D.p.R.K. agreed to work together to store safely the spent fuel from the five-megawatt reactor and dispose of it in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the D.p.R.K.
The two sides agreed to move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
Both sides agreed to work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
Both sides agreed to work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

In accordance with the terms of the Agreed Framework, in January 1995 the U.S. Government eased economic sanctions against North Korea in response to North Korea's decision to freeze its nuclear program and cooperate with U.S. and IAEA verification efforts. North Korea agreed to accept the decisions of KEDO, the financier and supplier of the LWRs, with respect to provision of the reactors. KEDO subsequently identified Sinpo as the LWR project site and held a groundbreaking ceremony in August 1997. In December 1999, KEDO and the (South) Korea Electric power Corporation (KEPCO) signed the Turnkey Contract (TKC), permitting full-scale construction of the LWRs.

In January 1995, as called for in the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, the U.S. and D.p.R.K. negotiated a method to store safely the spent fuel from the five-megawatt reactor. According to this method, U.S. and D.p.R.K. operators would work together to can the spent fuel and store the canisters in the spent fuel pond. Actual canning began in 1995. In April 2000, canning of all accessible spent fuel rods and rod fragments was declared complete.

In 1998, the U.S. identified an under-ground site in Kumchang-ni, D.p.R.K., which it suspected of being nuclear-related. In March 1999, after several rounds of negotiations, the U.S. and D.p.R.K. agreed that the U.S. would be granted "satisfactory access" to the underground site at Kumchang-ni. In October 2000, during Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok's visit to Washington, and after two visits to the site by teams of U.S. experts, the U.S. announced in a Joint Communiqué with the D.p.R.K. that U.S. concerns about the site had been resolved.

As called for in Dr. William perry's official review of U.S. policy toward North Korea, the U.S. and D.p.R.K. launched new negotiations in May 2000 called the Agreed Framework Implementation Talks.

Following the inauguration of president George W. Bush in January 2001, the new Administration began a review of North Korea policy. At the conclusion of that review, the Administration announced on June 6, 2001, that it had decided to pursue continued dialogue with North Korea on the full range of issues of concern to the Administration, including North Korea's conventional force posture, missile development and export programs, human rights practices, and humanitarian issues. In 2002, the Administration also became aware that North Korea was developing a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons purposes.

When U.S.-D.p.R.K. direct dialogue resumed in October 2002, this uranium enrichment program was high on the U.S. agenda. North Korean officials acknowledged to a U.S. delegation, headed by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and pacific Affairs James A. Kelly, the existence of the uranium enrichment program. Such a program violated North Korea's obligations under the NPT and its commitments in the 1992 North-South Denuclearization Declaration and the 1994 Agreed Framework. The U.S. side stated that North Korea would have to terminate the program before any further progress could be made in U.S. D.p.R.K. relations. The U.S. side also made clear that if this program were verifiably eliminated, the U.S. would be prepared to work with North Korea on the development of a fundamentally new relationship. In November 2002, the member countries of KEDO's Executive Board agreed to suspend heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea pending a resolution of the nuclear dispute.

In late 2002 and early 2003, North Korea terminated the freeze on its existing plutonium-based nuclear facilities, expelled IAEA inspectors and removed seals and monitoring

equipment, quit the NPT, and resumed reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to extract plutonium for weapons purposes. North Korea subsequently announced that it was taking these steps to provide itself with a deterrent force in the face of U.S. threats and the U.S.'s "hostile policy." Beginning in mid-2003, the North repeatedly claimed to have completed reprocessing of the spent fuel rods previously frozen at Yongbyon and later publicly said that the resulting fissile material would be used to bolster its "nuclear deterrent force." There is no independent confirmation of North Korea's claims.

President Bush has made clear that the U.S. has no intention to invade North Korea. He has also stressed that the U.S. seeks a peaceful end to North Korea's nuclear program in cooperation with North Korea's neighbors, who are most concerned with the threat to regional stability and security it poses. The U.S. goal is the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. North Korea's neighbors have joined the United States in supporting a nuclear weapons-free Korean peninsula.

Beginning in early 2003, the United States proposed multilateral talks among the most concerned parties aimed at reaching a settlement through diplomatic means. North Korea initially opposed such a process, maintaining that the nuclear dispute was purely a bilateral matter between the United States and the D.p.R.K. However, under pressure from its neighbors and with the active involvement of China, North Korea agreed to three-party talks with China and the U.S. in Beijing in April 2003 and to six-party talks with the U.S., China, South Korea, Japan and Russia in August 2003, also in Beijing. During the August 2003 round of six-party talks, North Korea agreed to the eventual elimination of its nuclear programs if the United States were first willing to sign a bilateral "non-aggression treaty" and meet various other conditions, including the provision of substantial amounts of aid and normalization of relations. The North Korean proposal was unacceptable to the United States, which insisted on a multilateral resolution to the issue, and refused to provide benefits or incentives for North Korea to abide by its previous international obligations. In October 2003, president Bush said he would be willing to consider a multi-lateral written security guarantee in the context of North Korea's complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of its nuclear weapons program.

China hosted a second round of six-party talks in Beijing in February 2004. The United States saw the results as positive, including the announced intention to hold a third round by the end of June, a willingness of all parties to form a working group to keep the process going between plenary sessions and an acceptance by China, Japan, Russia and the R.O.K. of the United States position that the central objective of the process was the complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the North's nuclear programs.

A third round of talks occurred in June 2004, with all participants agreeing in principle to meet again before the end of September. The U.S. is presently working with its partners to urge the DPRK to adhere to this agreement.

HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL HIGHLIGHTS

The Korean peninsula was first populated by peoples of a Tungusic branch of the Ural-Altaic language family, who migrated from the northwestern regions of Asia. Some of these peoples also populated parts of northeast China (Manchuria); Koreans and Manchurians still show physical similarities. Koreans are racially and linguistically homogeneous. Although there are no indigenous minorities in North Korea, there is a small Chinese community (about 50,000) and some 1,800 Japanese wives who accompanied the roughly 93,000 Koreans returning to the North from Japan between 1959 and 1962. Although dialects exist, the Korean spoken throughout the peninsula is mutually comprehensible. In North Korea, the Korean alphabet (hangul) is used exclusively.

Korea's traditional religions are Buddhism and Shamanism. Christian missionaries arrived as early as the 16th century, but it was not until the 19th century that major missionary activity began. pyongyang was a center of missionary activity, and there was a relatively large Christian population in the north before 1945. Although religious groups exist in North Korea today, the government severely restricts religious activity.

By the first century AD, the Korean peninsula was divided into the kingdoms of Shilla, Koguryo, and paekche. In 668 AD, the Shilla kingdom unified the peninsula. The Koryo dynasty—from which portuguese missionaries in the 16th century derived the Western name "Korea"—succeeded the Shilla kingdom in 935. The Choson dynasty, ruled by members of the Yi clan, supplanted Koryo in 1392 and lasted until Japan annexed Korea in 1910.

Throughout its history, Korea has been invaded, influenced, and fought over by its larger neighbors. Korea was under Mongolian occupation from 1231 until the early 14th century. The unifier of Japan, Hideyoshi, launched major invasions of Korea in 1592 and 1597. When Western powers focused "gunboat" diplomacy on Korea in the mid-19th century, Korea's rulers adopted a closed-door policy, earning Korea the title of "Hermit Kingdom." Though the Choson dynasty recognized China's hegemony in East Asia, Korea was independent until the late 19th century. At that time, China sought to block growing Japanese influence on the Korean peninsula and Russian pressure for commercial gains there. The competition produced the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Japan emerged victorious from both wars and in 1910 annexed Korea as part of the growing Japanese empire. Japanese colonial administration was characterized by tight control from Tokyo and ruthless efforts to supplant Korean language and culture. Organized Korean resistance during the colonial era was generally unsuccessful, and Japan remained firmly in control of the peninsula until the end of World War II in 1945. The surrender of Japan in August 1945 led to the immediate division of Korea into two occupation zones, with the U.S. administering the southern half of the peninsula and the U.S.S.R. taking over the area to the north of the 38th parallel. This division was meant to be temporary until the U.S., U.K., Soviet Union, and China could arrange a trustee-ship administration.

In December 1945, a conference was convened in Moscow to discuss the future of Korea. A 5-year trusteeship was discussed, and a joint Soviet-American commission was established. The commission met intermittently in Seoul but deadlocked over the issue of establishing a national government. In September 1947, with no solution in sight, the United States submitted the Korean question to the UN General Assembly. Initial hopes for a unified, independent Korea quickly evaporated as the politics of the Cold War and domestic opposition to the trusteeship plan resulted in the 1948 establishment of two separate nations with diametrically opposed political, economic, and social systems. In 1950, the North launched a massive surprise attack on the South (see, under Foreign Relations, Korean War of 1950-53).

ECONOMY

North Korea's faltering economy and the breakdown of trade relations with the countries of the former socialist bloc—especially following the fall of communism in eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union—have confronted pyongyang with difficult policy choices. Other centrally planned economies in similar straits have opted for domestic economic reform and liberalization of trade and investment.

Despite the introduction of wage and price reforms in 2002, the North Korean leadership seems determined to maintain tight political and ideological control. It has increasingly tolerated markets and a small private sector as the state-run distribution system has deteriorated. Another factor contributing to the economy's poor performance is the disproportionately large percentage of GNp (possibly as much as 25%) that North Korea devotes to the military.

About 80% of North Korea's terrain consists of moderately high mountain ranges and partially forested mountains and hills separated by deep, narrow valleys and small, cultivated plains. The most rugged areas are the north and east coasts. Good harbors are found on the eastern coast. pyongyang, the capital, near the country's west coast, is located on the Taedong River.

North Korean industry is operating at only a small fraction of capacity due to lack of fuel, spare parts, and other inputs. Agriculture is now 30% of total GNp, even though output has not recovered to early 1990 levels. The infrastructure of the North is generally poor and outdated, and its energy sector has collapsed.

North Korea suffers from chronic food shortages, which were exacerbated by record floods in the summer of 1995 and continued shortages of fertilizer and parts. China and South Korea have responded by making long-term loans on concessional terms to pay for food imports and by direct bilateral food, fertilizer, and energy grants and loans in-kind. International organizations and non-governmental organizations are also providing significant amounts of food. In response to international appeals, the U.S. provided nearly 2 million tons of humanitarian food aid between 1996 and 2003 through the UN World Food program and through U.S. private voluntary organizations.

Development policy

In 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and termination of subsidized trade arrangements with Russia, other former Communist states, and China, the D.p.R.K. announced the creation of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the northeast regions of Najin, Chongjin, and Sonbong. Investment in this SEZ has been slow.

Problems with infrastructure, bureaucracy, and uncertainties about investment security and viability have hindered growth and development. The government announced in 2002 plans to establish a Special Administrative Region (SAR) in Sinuiju, at the western end of the D.p.R.K.-China border. However, the government has taken few concrete steps to establish the Sinuiju SAR, and its future is uncertain.

North Korea implemented changes in its economic policies in 2002, including sharp increases in prices and wages, changes in foreign investment laws, a steep currency devaluation, and limited increases in flexibility and responsibility for economic enterprises.

The changes have failed to stimulate recovery of the industrial sector, though there are reports of changed economic behavior at the enterprise and individual level. One unintended consequence of the 2002 changes has been severe inflation. An increasing number of North Koreans now try to work in the informal sector to cope with growing hardship and reduced government support.

North-South Economic Ties

Two-way trade between North and South Korea, legalized in 1988, had risen to $642 million by 2002, much of it processing or assembly work undertaken in the North. This is an increase of 59.3% over 2001 but the total includes a substantial quantity of non-trade goods provided to the North as humanitarian assistance or as part of inter-Korean cooperative projects. An estimated 50.1% of the total trade ($343 million) was commercial transactions and trade based on processing-on-commission arrangements.

Since the June 2000 North-South summit, North and South Korea have reached agreement to reconnect east and west coast railroads where they cross the DMZ. In addition, the two governments plan to build highways near both railroad lines. Much of the work on the northern side has been funded by the R.O.K. Groundbreaking on the Kaesong Industrial Complex, located just north of the DMZ near the western railroad line, took place in June 2003.

In an effort to reassure potential R.O.K. investors, in August 2003 North and South Korea ratified four agreements first signed in 2002: an investment guarantee agreement; an agreement to avoid double taxation; a dispute settlement agreement; and an agreement on clearance of accounting transactions. It remains to be seen how quickly construction of the Kaesong Industrial Complex will move forward and how many South Korean companies will decide to locate operations there.

Trade with the U.S.

The United States imposed a total embargo on trade with North Korea in June 1950 when North Korea attacked the South. U.S. law also prohibited financial transactions between the two countries. Since 1989, and most notably in June 2000, the U.S. eased sanctions against North Korea to allow a wide range of exports and imports of U.S. and D.p.R.K. commercial and consumer goods. Imports from North Korea are permitted, subject to an approval process. Direct personal and commercial financial transactions are allowed between U.S. and D.p.R.K. persons. Restrictions on investment also have been eased. Commercial U.S. ships and aircraft carrying U.S. goods are allowed to call at D.p.R.K. ports. The Departments of Commerce and Transportation repealed joint Transportation Order T-2. This order had previously imposed special restrictions on transport to and from North Korea. To date this easing has resulted in little economic activity.

The Departments of Treasury, Commerce, and Transportation have issued regulations, published in the June 19, 2000, Federal Register, addressing trade and financial transactions with North Korea. points of Contact:

Treasury—Dennisp. Wood, Chief of Compliance programs, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Tel. (202) 622-2490, http://www.treas.gov/ofac;

Commerce—Joan Roberts, Director, Foreign policy Controls Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, Tel. (202) 482-0171;

Transportation—Christopher T. Tourtellot, Office of the Assistant General Counsel for International Law, Tel. (202) 366-9183.

This easing of sanctions does not affect U.S. counterterrorism or nonproliferation controls on North Korea, which prohibit exports of military and sensitive dual-use items and most types of U.S. assistance. Statutory restrictions, such as U.S. missile sanctions, remain in place.

Restrictions on North Korea based on multilateral arrangements also remain in place. Finally, North Korea does not enjoy "Normal Trade Relations" with the United States so its goods are subject to a higher tariff upon entry to the United States.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

North Korea has a centralized government under the rigid control of the communist Korean Workers' party (KWP), to which all government officials belong. A few minor political parties are allowed to exist in name only. Kim Il Sung ruled North Korea from 1948 until his death in July 1994. Kim served both as Secretary General of the KWp and as president of North Korea.

Little is known about the actual lines of power and authority in the North Korean Government despite the formal structure set forth in the constitution. Following the death of Kim Il Sung, his son—Kim Jong Il—inherited supreme power. Kim Jong Il was named General Secretary of the Korean Workers' party in October 1997, and in September 1998, the SPA reconfirmed Kim Jong Il as Chairman of the National Defense Commission and declared that position as the "highest office of state." However, the president of the presidium of the National Assembly, Kim Yong Nam, serves as the nominal head of state. North Korea's 1972 constitution was amended in late 1992.

The constitution designates the Central people's Committee (CPC) as the government's top policymaking body. The CPC makes policy decisions and supervises the cabinet, or State Administration Council (SAC). The SAC is headed by a premier and is the dominant administrative and executive agency.

Officially, the legislature, the Supreme people's Assembly, is the highest organ of state power. Its members are elected every four years. Usually only two meetings are held annually, each lasting a few days. A standing committee elected by the SPA performs legislative functions when the Assembly is not in session. In reality, the Assembly serves only to ratify decisions made by the ruling KWP.

North Korea's judiciary is "accountable" to the SPA and the president. The SPA's standing committee also appoints judges to the highest court for four-year terms that are concurrent with those of the Assembly.

Administratively, North Korea is divided into nine provinces and four provincial-level municipalities—pyongyang, Chongjin, Nampo, and Kaesong. It also appears to be divided into nine military districts.

principal Government Officials

Last Updated: 1/13/05

General Secretary, Korean Workers' party(KWP): KIM Jong Il, Mar.
Supreme Cdr. of Korean people's Army(KPA): KIM Jong Il, Mar.
Chmn., National Defense Commission(NDC): KIM Jong Il, Mar.
First Vice Chmn., NDC: JO Myong Rok, VMar.
Vice Chmn. NDC: YON Hyong Muk
Vice Chmn., NDC: RI Yong Mu, VMar.
Member, NDC: KIM Yong Chun, VMar.
Member, NDC: KIM Il Chol, VMar.
Member, NDC: JON pyong Ho
Member, NDC: PAEK Se Bong

Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) Presidium
pres., SPA presidium: KIM Yong Nam
Vice pres., SPA presidium: YANG Hyong Sop
Vice pres., SPA presidium: KIM Yong Dae
Honorary Vice pres., SPA presidium: PAK Song Chol
Honorary Vice pres., SPA presidium: KIM Yong Ju
Sec. Gen., SPA presidium: KIM Yun Hyok
Member, SPA: RYU Mi Yong
Member, SPA: KANG Yong Sop
Member, SPA: PAK Thae Hwa
Member, SPA: HONG Sok Hyong
Member, SPA: RI Kwang Ho
Member, SPA: KIM Kyong Ho
Member, SPA: RYOM Sun Gil
Member, SPA: SUNG Sang Sop
Member, SPA: PAK Sun Hui
Member, SPA: PYON Yong Rip
Member, SPA: THAE Hyong Chol
Cabinet:
premier: PAK pong Ju
Vice premier: KWAK pom Gi Vice premier: RO Tu Chol
Vice premier: JON Sung Hun
Min. of Agriculture: RI Kyong Sik
Min. of Chemical Industry: RI Mu Yong
Min. of City Management: CHOE Jong Gon
Min. of Commerce: RI Yong Son
Min. of Construction & Building-Materials Industries:
Min. of Crude Oil Industry:
Min. of Culture: CHOE Ik Gyu
Min. of Education: KIM Yong Jin
Min. of Electronic Industry: O Su Yong
Min. of Extractive Industries: RI Kwang Nam
Min. of Finance: MUN Il Bong
Min. of Fisheries: RI Song Ung
Min. of Foreign Affairs: PAEK Nam Sun
Min. of Foreign Trade: RIM Kyong Man
Min. of Forestry: SOK Kun Su
Min. of Labor: RI Won Il
Min. of Land & Environment protection: JANG Il Son
Min. of Land & Marine Transport: KIM Yong Il
Min. of Light Industry: RI Ju O
Min. of Metal & Machine-Building Industries: KIM Sung Hyon
Min. of people's Security: JU Sang Song
Min. of post & Telecommunications: RI Kum Bom
Min. of power & Coal Industries: JU Tong Il
Min. of procurement & Food Administration: CHOE Nam Gyun
Min. of public Health: KIM Su Hak
Min. of Railways: KIM Yong Sam
Min. of State Construction Control: PAE Tal Jun
Min. of State Inspection: KIM Ui Sun
Chmn., State planning Commission: KIM Kwang Rin
Chmn., physical Culture & Sports Guidance Commission: MUN Jae Dok
pres., National Academy of Sciences: PYON Yong Rip
pres., Central Bank: KIM Wan Su
Dir., Central Statistics Bureau: KIM Chang Su
Chief Sec.: JONG Mun San
Min. of people's Armed Forces (is not subordinate to the Cabinet): KIM Il Chol, VMar.
permanent Representative to the UN, New York: PAK Kil Yon

DEFENSE AND MILITARY ISSUES

North Korea now has the fourth-largest army in the world. It has an estimated 1.2 million armed personnel, compared to about 650,000 in the South. Military spending equals 20%-25% of GNp, with about 20% of men ages 17-54 in the regular armed forces. North Korean forces have a substantial numerical advantage over the South (approximately 2 or 3 to 1) in several key categories of offensive weapons—tanks, long-range artillery, and armored personnel carriers.

The North has perhaps the world's second-largest special operations force, designed for insertion behind the lines in wartime. While the North has a relatively impressive fleet of submarines, its surface fleet has a very limited capability. Its air force has twice the number of aircraft as the South, but, except for a few advanced fighters, the North's air force is obsolete. The North deploys the bulk of its forces well forward, along the DMZ. Several North Korean military tunnels under the DMZ were discovered in the 1970s.

In 1953, the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) was created to oversee and enforce the terms of the armistice. Over the past decade, North Korea has sought to dismantle the MAC in a push for a new "peace mechanism" on the peninsula. In April 1994, it declared the MAC void and withdrew its representatives. Over the last several years, North Korea has moved more of its rear-echelon troops to hardened bunkers closer to the DMZ. Given the proximity of Seoul to the DMZ (some 25 miles), South Korean and U.S. forces are likely to have little warning of any attack. The United States and South Korea continue to believe that the U.S. troop presence in South Korea remains an effective deterrent.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

North Korea's relationship with the South has informed much of its post-World War II history and still drives much of its foreign policy. North and South Korea have had a difficult and acrimonious relationship from the Korean War. In recent years, North Korea has pursued a mixed policy—seeking to develop economic relations with South Korea and to win the support of the South Korean public for greater North-South engagement while at the same time continuing to denounce the R.O.K.'s security relationship with the United States and maintaining a threatening conventional force posture on the DMZ and in adjacent waters.

North Korea's neighbors are China to the north and to the west across the Yellow Sea, Russia in the northeast, Japan to the east across the Sea of Japan, and South Korea to the south.

The military demarcation line (MDL) of separation between the belligerent sides at the close of the Korean War divides North Korea from South Korea. A demilitarized zone (DMZ) extends for 2,000 meters (just over 1 mile) on either side of the MDL. Both the North and South Korean governments hold that the MDL is only a temporary administrative line, not a permanent border.

During the postwar period, both Korean governments have repeatedly affirmed their desire to reunify the Korean peninsula, but until 1971 the two governments had no direct, official communications or other contact.

Korean War of 1950-53

As noted, differences developed after World War II over the issue of establishing a Korean national government. Elections were held in the South under UN observation, and on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was established in the South. Syngman Rhee, a nationalist leader, became the Republic's first president. On September 9, 1948, the North established the Democratic people's Republic of Korea headed by then-premier Kim Il Sung, who had been fostered and supported by the U.S.S.R. North Korean forces invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. The United Nations, in accordance with the terms of its Charter, engaged in its first collective action and established the UN Command (UNC), to which 16 member nations sent troops and assistance. Next to South Korea, the United States contributed the largest contingent of forces to this international effort. The battle line fluctuated north and south, and after large numbers of Chinese "people's Volunteers" intervened to assist the North, the battle line stabilized north of Seoul near the 38th parallel.

Armistice negotiations began in July 1951, but hostilities continued until July 27, 1953. On that date, at panmunjom, the military commanders of the North Korean people's Army, the Chinese people's Volunteers, and the UNC signed an armistice agreement. Neither the United States nor South Korea is a signatory to the armistice per se, although both adhere to it through the UNC. No comprehensive peace agreement has replaced the 1953 armistice pact; thus, a condition of belligerency still exists on the peninsula.

Reunification Efforts Since 1971

In August 1971, North and South Korea held talks through their respective Red Cross societies with the aim of reuniting the many Korean families separated following the division of Korea and the Korean War. In July 1972, the two sides agreed to work toward peaceful reunification and an end to the hostile atmosphere prevailing on the peninsula. Officials exchanged visits, and regular communications were established through a North-South coordinating committee and the Red Cross.

However, these initial contacts broke down in 1973 following South Korean president park Chung Hee's announcement that the South would seek separate entry into the United Nations and after the kidnapping from Tokyo of South Korean opposition leader Kim Dae-Jung by the South Korean intelligence service. There was no other significant contact between North and South Korea until 1984.

Dialogue was renewed in September 1984, when South Korea accepted the North's offer to provide relief goods to victims of severe flooding in South Korea. Red Cross talks to address the plight of separated families resumed, as did talks on economic and trade issues and parliamentary-level discussions. However, the North then unilaterally suspended all talks in January 1986, arguing that the annual U.S.-South Korea "Team Spirit" military exercise was inconsistent with dialogue. There was a brief flurry of negotiations that year on cohosting the upcoming 1988 Seoul Olympics, which ended in failure and was followed by the 1987 bombing of a South Korean commercial aircraft (KAL 858) by North Korean agents.

In July 1988, South Korean president Roh Tae Woo called for new efforts to promote North-South exchanges, family reunification, inter-Korean trade, and contact in international forums. Roh followed up this initiative in a UN General Assembly speech in which South Korea offered for the first time to discuss security matters with the North. Initial meetings that grew out of Roh's proposals started in September 1989. In September 1990, the first of eight prime minister-level meetings between North Korean and South Korean officials took place in Seoul. The prime ministerial talks resulted in two major agreements: the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation (the "Basic Agreement") and the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula (the "Joint Declaration").

The Basic Agreement, signed on December 13, 1991, called for reconciliation and nonaggression and established four joint commissions. These commissions—on South-North reconciliation, South-North military affairs, South-North economic exchanges and cooperation, and South-North social and cultural exchange—were to work out the specifics for implementing the basic agreement. Subcommittees to examine specific issues were created, and liaison offices were established in panmunjom, but in the fall of 1992 the process came to a halt because of rising tension over North Korea's nuclear program.

The Joint Declaration on denuclearization was initialed on December 31, 1991. It forbade both sides to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons and forbade the possession of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. A procedure for inter-Korean inspection was to be organized and a North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) was mandated to verify the denuclearization of the peninsula.

On January 30, 1992, the D.p.R.K. finally signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as it had pledged to do in 1985 when acceding to the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. This safeguards agreement allowed IAEA inspections to begin in June 1992. In March 1992, the JNCC was established in accordance with the Joint Declaration, but subsequent meetings failed to reach agreement on the main issue of establishing a bilateral inspection regime.

As the 1990s progressed, concern over the North's nuclear program became a major issue in North-South relations and between North Korea and the U.S. The lack of progress on implementation of the Joint Declaration's provision for an inter-Korean nuclear inspection regime led to reinstatement of the U.S.-South Korea Team Spirit military exercise for 1993. The situation worsened rapidly when North Korea, in January 1993, refused IAEA access to two suspected nuclear waste sites and then announced in March 1993 its intent to withdraw from the NPT. During the next two years, the U.S. held direct talks with the D.p.R.K. that resulted in a series of agreements on nuclear matters. The Agreed Framework of 1994, however, broke down in 2002 when North Korea was discovered to be pursuing a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons. In 2003, a six-party talks process began with the goal of achieving a diplomatic resolution that would verifiably and permanently eliminate the North's nuclear weapons programs (see, under U.S. policy Toward North Korea, Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula).

Relations Outside the peninsula

Throughout the Cold War, North Korea balanced its relations with China and the Soviet Union to extract the maximum benefit from the relationships at minimum political cost. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, the Soviet-backed Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan created strains between China and the Soviet Union and, in turn, in North Korea's relations with its two major communist allies. North Korea tried to avoid becoming embroiled in the Sino-Soviet split, obtaining aid from both the Soviet Union and China and trying to avoid dependence on either. Following Kim Il Sung's 1984 visit to Moscow, there was an improvement in Soviet-D.p.R.K. relations, resulting in renewed deliveries of Soviet weaponry to North Korea and increases in economic aid.

The establishment of diplomatic relations by South Korea with the Soviet Union in 1990 and with the P.R.C. in 1992 put a serious strain on relations between North Korea and its traditional allies. Moreover, the fall of communism in eastern Europe in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in a significant drop in communist aid to North Korea. Despite these changes and its past reliance on this military and economic assistance, North Korea continued to proclaim a militantly independent stance in its foreign policy in accordance with its official ideology of juche, or self-reliance.

Both North and South Korea became parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987. (North Korea is not a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention, nor is it a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

However, North Korea has maintained membership in a variety of multilateral organizations. It became a member of the UN in September 1991. North Korea also belongs to the Food and Agriculture Organization; the International Civil Aviation Organization; the International postal Union; the UN Conference on Trade and Development; the International Telecommunications Union; the UN Development program; the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the World Health Organization; the World Intellectual property Organization; the World Meteorological Organization; the International Maritime Organization; the International Committee of the Red Cross; and the Nonaligned Movement.

In the mid-1990s, when the economic situation worsened dramatically and following the death of D.p.R.K.founder Kim Il Sung, the North abandoned some of the more extreme manifestations of its "self reliance" ideology to accept foreign humanitarian relief and create the possibility, as noted above, for foreign investment in the North. In subsequent years, the D.p.R.K. has continued to pursue a tightly restricted policy of opening to the world in search of economic aid and development assistance. However, this has been matched by an increased determination to counter perceived external or internal threats by a self-proclaimed "army first" policy.

During this period of limited, extremely cautious opening, North Korea has sought to broaden its formal diplomatic relationships as well. In July 2000, North Korea began participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as Foreign Minister paek Nam Sun attended the ARF ministerial meeting in Bangkok July 26-27. The D.p.R.K. also expanded its bilateral diplomatic ties in that year, establishing diplomatic relations with Italy, Australia, and the philippines. The UK, Germany, and many other European countries have established diplomatic relations with the North as have Australia and Canada.

Terrorism

The D.p.R.K. is not known to have sponsored terrorist acts since 1987, when KAL 858 was bombed in flight. The D.p.R.K. has made statements condemning terrorism. In October 2000, the U.S. and the D.p.R.K. issued a Joint Statement in which "the two sides agreed that international terrorism poses an unacceptable threat to global security and peace, and that terrorism should be opposed in all its forms." The U.S. and D.p.R.K. agreed to support the international legal regime combating international terrorism and to cooperate with each other to fight terrorism. However, pyongyang continues to provide sanctuary to members of the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction who participated in the hijacking of a Japan Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970.

TRAVEL

Consular Information Sheet

August 11, 2004

Country Description: The Democratic people's Republic of Korea (North Korea or DPRK) is a highly militaristic Communist state located on the Korean peninsula between northeast China and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The DPRK is one of the world's most isolated countries and has endured the almost total collapse over the past fifteen years of its once industrialized economy. The continuing dispute over North Korea's nuclear programs has increased tension in the region and between the United States and the DPRK. North Korea limits trade and transportation links with other countries and tightly restricts the circumstances under which foreigners may enter the country and interact with local citizens. Telephone and fax communications are unavailable in many areas of the country and foreigners can expect their communications to be monitored by DPRK officials. In recent years, North Korea has experienced famine, fuel and electricity shortages, and outbreaks of disease. Many countries, including the United States, have contributed to international relief efforts to assist the people of North Korea.

In recent years, the DPRK has attempted to attract foreign tourists as a means of earning much needed foreign currency, but an underdeveloped service sector, inadequate infrastructure, and political tensions with surrounding countries have hobbled these efforts. North Korea's efforts to expand tourism have focused primarily on group tours from China, Japan and particularly South Korea.

Interim Consular protecting power: The United States does not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with the DPRK. The U.S. Government therefore cannot provide normal consular protective services to U.S. citizens in North Korea. On September 20, 1995, a consular protecting power arrangement was implemented, allowing the Swedish Embassy in the DPRK capital, pyongyang, to provide basic consular protective services to U.S. citizens traveling in North Korea who are ill, injured, arrested or who have died while there.

Entry/Exit Requirements: North Korean visas are required for entry. The U.S. Government does not issue letters to private Americans seeking North Korean visas, even though in the past such letters have sometimes been requested by DPRK Embassies. As most travelers enter North Korea from China, prospective travelers generally also need to obtain a two-entry visa for China. A valid Chinese visa is essential for departing from North Korea at the conclusion of a visit or in an emergency. While the Republic of Korea government is attempting to open direct travel routes to the DPRK, routine travel from the Republic of Korea to the DPRK is currently prohibited. Travel across the demilitarized zone is allowed only infrequently for official and government-authorized cultural and economic exchanges. There are no regularly operating direct commercial flights from South to North Korea at this time. U.S. citizens who arrive in North Korea without a valid U.S. passport and North Korean visa may be detained, arrested, fined or denied entry. Individuals traveling to North Korea report that fees for local travel costs (taxi, tolls, permits and the cost for security personnel assigned to escort foreigner visitors) can be high and arbitrary.

In an effort to prevent international child abduction, many governments have initiated procedures at entry/exit points. These often include requiring documentary evidence of relationship and permission for the child's travel from the parents or legal guardians if not present. Having such documentation on hand, even if not required, may facilitate entry/departure.

Where to obtain a North Korean visa: There is no DPRK embassy in the United States. U.S. citizens and residents planning travel to North Korea must obtain DPRK visas in third countries. For information about entry requirements and restricted areas, contact the DPRK Mission to the United Nations in New York. Address inquiries to:

The permanent Representative of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations
820 Second Avenue
New York, New York 10017,
Tel: (1-212) 972-3105;
Fax: (1-212) 972-3154

Americans living abroad can contact the DPRK Embassy, if any, in their country of residence.

U.S. citizens traveling to North Korea usually obtain their visas at the DPRK Embassy in Beijing, China, which will only issue visas after receiving authorization from the DPRK Foreign Ministry in pyongyang. prior to traveling to the region, travelers may wish to confirm that authorization to issue their visa has been received from pyongyang. Americans can call the North Korean Embassy in Beijing prior to their travel by telephone at (86-10) 6532-1186 or 6532-1189 (fax: 6532-6056).

Dual Nationality: The Democratic people's Republic of Korea does not recognize dual nationality. U.S. citizens of Korean heritage are often regarded with suspicion by North Korean officials and may even be treated as North Korean citizens. DPRK laws on dual nationality may impose special obligations upon people with North Korean ethnic backgrounds who are citizens of other countries such as military service or taxes on foreign source income. U. S. citizens of Korean origin may be charged with offenses allegedly committed prior to their original departure from Korea.

Safety and Security: government security personnel closely monitor the activities and conversations of foreigners in North Korea. Hotel rooms, telephones and fax machines may be monitored, and personal possessions in hotel rooms may be searched. photographing roads, bridges, airports, rail stations, or anything other than designated public tourist sites can be perceived as espionage and may result in confiscation of cameras and film or even detention. DPRK border officials routinely confiscate visitors' cell phones on arrival, returning the phone only on departure. Foreign visitors to North Korea may be arrested, detained or expelled for activities that would not be considered criminal outside the DPRK, including involvement in unsanctioned religious and political activities, engaging in unauthorized travel or interaction with the local population.

For the latest security information, Americans traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department's Internet web site at Http://travel.state.gov where the current Worldwide Caution public Announcement, Travel Warnings and public Announcements can be found. Up to date information on security can also be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the U.S., or, for callers outside the United States and Canada, a regular toll line at 1-317-472-2328. These numbers are available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Standard time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays). Callers who are unable to use toll-free numbers, such as those calling from overseas, may obtain information and assistance during these hours by calling 1-317-472-2328.

Crime: The North Korean government does not release statistics on crime. Violent crime is very rare and street crime is uncommon in pyongyang. There are reports suggesting that widespread economic desperation in North Korea has led to an increased crime rate outside pyongyang. petty thefts have been reported, especially at the airport in pyongyang.

The loss or theft abroad of a U.S. passport should be reported immediately to the local police and to the Swedish Embassy. If you are a victim of a crime while in North Korea, in addition to reporting to local police, please contact the Swedish embassy for assistance.

U.S. citizens may refer to the Department of State's pamphlet A Safe Trip Abroad for ways to promote a trouble-free journey. The pamphlet is available by mail from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, via the Internet at http://www.gpoaccess.gov, or via the Bureau of Consular Affairs home page at http://travel.state.gov.

Medical Facilities: persons with medical problems should not travel to North Korea. Medical care for Americans who become ill or injured in North Korea, including emergency medical evacuation, is generally not available. Hospitals in pyongyang and other cities often lack heat, medicine, and supplies, and suffer from frequent power outages and outbreaks of infection. Hospitals do not generally provide food for patients. Reagents for diagnosing infectious diseases such as tuberculosis are generally unavailable. Americans should not bring personal medications to North Korea without written authorization from the North Korean Government. Absent such permission, persons requiring regular medication should not travel to North Korea. Hospitals will expect immediate U.S. dollar cash payment for medical treatment. Credit cards and checks have not been honored in the past according to diplomatic personnel stationed in the DPRK. Medical evacuation from pyongyang to China requires several days to arrange. Evacuation by air from rural areas of North Korea to the capital is not feasible.

Medical Insurance: The Department of State strongly urges Americans to consult with their medical insurance company prior to traveling abroad to confirm whether their policy applies overseas and if it will cover emergency expenses such as medical evacuation. U.S. medical insurance plans seldom cover health costs incurred outside the United States unless supplemental coverage is purchased. Further, U.S. Medicare and Medicaid programs do not provide payment for medical services outside the United States. However, many travel agents and private companies offer insurance plans that will cover health care expenses incurred overseas, including emergency services such as medical evacuations.

When making a decision regarding health insurance, American should consider that many foreign doctors require payment in cash prior to providing service and that a medical evacuation to the U.S. may cost well in excess of $50,000. Uninsured travelers who require medical care over-seas often face extreme difficulties. When consulting with your insurer prior to your trip, ascertain whether payment will be made to the overseas healthcare provider or if you will be reimbursed later for expenses you incur. Some insurance policies also include coverage for psychiatric treatment and for disposition of remains in the event of death.

In the case of a critical illness or accident, the Swedish Embassy, acting as protecting power for the United States, would attempt to arrange flight clearances for air ambulances performing emergency medical evacuations. Medical air evacuation costs vary, but average approximately $40,000 to $50,000 for medical, personnel, aircraft and clearance costs. Clearances can usually be arranged within one week. Medical evacuation by regularly scheduled airlines can be arranged, but is limited to the very small number of flights that currently operate from pyongyang to Beijing, Dalian, Shenyang and Macau. Chinese visas for injured foreigners and any escorts must be obtained prior to the evacuation from North Korea in order to transit China. Even in the case of a medical emergency, transit visas may take several days to arrange. Evacuation across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to South Korea is not allowed.

If an American citizen falls ill or is injured while traveling to the DPRK, accompanying travelers or family members should immediately contact the Swedish protecting power using the phone numbers listed below.

The Embassy of Sweden,
Munsu-Dong District,
pyongyang, DPRK
Telephone and fax numbers for the Swedish protecting
power are: Tel: (850-2) 3817 908;
Fax: (850-2) 3817 258.

Notification should also be made to the U.S. Embassy's American Citizen Services Unit in Beijing, China using the phone numbers listed below:

U.S. Embassy in Beijing
American Citizen Services
Number 2 Xiushui Dong Jie
Beijing, China 100600
Telephone: (86-10) 6532-3431, ext.
5344, 5648 or 5028.;
Fax: (86-10) 6532-4153.

After hours please call (86-10) 6532-1910 and ask for the Embassy duty officer. Americans who wish to contact U.S. consular officials in China can e-mail questions to: www.amcitbeijing@state.gov.

Companies that may be able to arrange evacuation services include, but are not limited to:

SOS International (www.intsos.com) U.S. telephone: (1-800) 468-5232 China telephone: (86-10) 6462-9100/9112/9199)

Medex Assistance Corporation (www.medexasst@aol.com) U.S. telephone: (410) 453-6300/6301 Toll free: (1-800) 537-2029, China telephone: (86-10) 6595-8510)

Global Doctor (www.eglobaldoctor.com), China telephone: (86-21) 64311541, (86-21) 64311537 or (86-10) 83151914).

Travelers may wish to contact these or other emergency medical assistance providers for information about their ability to provide medical evacuation insurance and/or assistance for travelers to North Korea.

Useful information on medical emergencies abroad, including overseas insurance programs, is provided in the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs brochure Medical Information for Americans Traveling Abroad, available via the Bureau of Consular Affairs home page.

Other Health Information: All necessary vaccinations should be administered prior to traveling to North Korea. Vaccinations recommended and disease prevention information for travelers are available from the Centers for Disease Control and prevention's International Travelers' Hotline, which may be reached from the United States at 1-877-FYI-TRIp (1-877-394-8747), via its toll-free autofax number at 1-888-CDC-FAXX 1-888-232-3299), or via the CDC Internet site at: http://www.cdc.gov/travel. In addition, travelers with special dietary requirements are advised to bring food with them to North Korea, as the few restaurants available to foreigners are often closed for lack of supplies and, in any case, have limited menus that lack variety and nutritional adequacy.

Traffic Safety and Road Conditions: While in a foreign country, U.S. citizens may encounter road conditions that differ significantly from those in the United States. The information below concerning North Korea is provided for general reference only, and may not be totally accurate in a particular location or situation.

Safety of public Transportation: poor
Urban Road Conditions/Maintenance: Good
Rural Road Conditions/Maintenance: poor
Availability of Roadside Assistance: Nonexistent

Foreigners are not allowed to drive in North Korea. Streets are often unlit due to electricity shortages. Taxis are not generally available, and cars are often in dangerous disrepair. pyongyang has a subway system. City buses are often idled due to lack of fuel. Roads outside of cities may be hazardous, especially during winter months. North Korea has a functioning rail transport system; however delays occur often. Bicycles are unavailable for rental or purchase. Local citizens may be unwilling to assist Americans injured in road accidents for fear of repercussions following an unauthorized interaction with a foreigner. For additional general information about road safety, including links to foreign government sites, see the Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs home page at http://travel.state.gov/travel/abroad_roadsafety.html.

Aviation Safety Oversight: As there is no direct commercial air service between the U.S. and North Korea by local carriers at present, nor economic authority to operate such service, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has not assessed North Korea's Civil Aviation Authority for compliance with international aviation safety standards for oversight of North Korea's air carrier operations. For further information, travelers may contact the Department of Transportation at 1-800-322-7873, or visit the FAA Internet home page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa/index.htm.

Customs Regulations: DPRK authorities may seize documents, literature, audio and videotapes, compact discs and letters that they deem to be pornographic, political or intended for religious proselytizing. persons seeking to enter North Korea with religious materials in a quantity deemed to be greater than that needed for personal use can be detained, fined and expelled. It is advisable to contact the DPRK Mission to the United Nations or a DPRK embassy or consulate in a third country for specific information regarding customs requirements.

In many countries around the world, counterfeit and pirated goods are widely available. Transactions involving such products are illegal and bringing them back to the United States may result in forfeitures and/or fines. A current list of those countries with serious problems in this regard can be found at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/2003/special301.htm.

Criminal penalties: While in a foreign country, a U.S. citizen is subject to that country's laws and regulations, which sometimes differ significantly from those in the United States. Local laws also may not afford the protections available to U.S. citizens under U.S. law. penalties for breaking the law can be more severe than in the United States for similar offenses. persons violating the law, even unknowingly, may be expelled, arrested or imprisoned. penalties for possession, use or trafficking in illegal drugs are strict, and convicted offenders often face long jail sentences and heavy fines. North Korean security personnel, especially in cases where the Americans are originally from Korea or who are thought to understand the Korean language, may view unescorted travel by Americans inside North Korea without explicit official authorization as espionage. Security personal may also view any attempt to engage in unauthorized conversations with a citizen of the DPRK as espionage. Foreigners are subject to fines or arrest for unauthorized currency transactions or for shopping at stores not designated for foreigners. It is a criminal act in North Korea to show disrespect to the country's current and former leaders, Kim Jong-Il and Kim Il-Sung. Foreign journalists have been threatened when questioning the policies or public statements of the DPRK, or the actions of the current leadership.

Under the PROTECT Act of April 2003, it is a crime, prosecutable in the United States, for a U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien, to engage in illicit sexual conduct in a foreign country with a person under the age of 18, whether or not the U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident alien intended to engage in such illicit sexual conduct prior to going abroad. For purposes of the PROTECT Act, illicit sexual conduct includes any commercial sex act in a foreign country with a person under the age of 18. The law defines a commercial sex act as any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by a person under the age of 18.

Under the protection of Children from Sexual predators Act of 1998, it is a crime to use the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce, including the Internet, to transmit information about a minor under the age of 16 for criminal sexual purposes that include, among other things, the production of child pornography. This same law makes it a crime to use any facility of interstate or foreign commerce, including the Internet, to transport obscene materials to minors under the age of 16.

Consular Access: There is no United States diplomatic or consular presence in the DPRK. Traveling Americans may receive limited consular services from the Swedish Embassy in pyongyang. please note paragraph 18, below, for address and contact information for the Swedish Embassy in pyongyang. U.S. citizens are encouraged to carry photocopies of their passport data and photo pages with them at all times so that, if questioned by DPRK officials, proof of their U.S. citizenship is readily available. The U.S.-DPRK Interim Consular Agreement provides that North Korea will notify the Swedish Embassy within four days of an arrest or detention of an American citizen and will allow consular visits within two days after a request is made by the Swedish Embassy. However, consular access has not been readily granted in cases where American citizens have been reported as being detained or held against their will by DPRK officials.

U.S. Government Economic Sanctions Against North Korea: On June 19, 2000, the U.S. implemented an easing of economic sanctions against North Korea. Imports from North Korea are allowed, subject to an approval process. Direct personal and commercial financial transactions are allowed between U.S. and North Korean citizens. Restrictions on investment have also been eased. Commercial U.S. ships and aircraft carrying U.S. goods are allowed to call at North Korean ports with prior clearance.

The easing of sanctions does not affect U.S. counter-terrorism or nonproliferation controls on North Korea, which prohibit exports of military and sensitive dual-use items and most types of U.S. assistance. Statutory restrictions, such as U.S. missile sanctions, remain in place. Restrictions on North Korea based on multi-lateral arrangements also remain in place.

Regulations implementing the easing of sanctions have been issued by the Departments of Treasury, Commerce and Transportation, are published in the Federal Register, and can be found on the Internet at http://www.nara.gov./feeders. For additional information, consult the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) home page on the Internet at http://www.treas.gov/ofac or via OFAC's Info-by-Fax service at (1-202) 622-0077, which is available by telephone or by using a fax machine phone.

Interested parties can also consult the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration at http://www.bxa.doc.gov, and the U.S. Department of Transportation at http://www.dot.gov for additional information.

Children's Issues: For information on international adoption of children, international parental child abduction, and international child support enforcement issues, please refer to our Internet site at http://travel.state.gov/children's_issues.html or telephone Overseas Citizens Services at 1-888-407-4747. This number is available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays). Callers who are unable to use toll-free numbers, such as those calling from overseas, may obtain information and assistance during these hours by calling 1-317-472-2328.

Registration/Embassy Location: There is no U.S. Embassy or Consulate in North Korea. The Swedish Embassy, which acts as U.S. protecting power, is located at Munsu-Dong District, pyongyang. The telephone and fax numbers for the Swedish protecting power are, Tel: (850-2) 3817 908: Fax: (850-2) 3817 258. Americans who have a medical or consular emergency, who wish to contact the Swedish protecting power are reminded first to communicate this need to their escorts or guides. Do not attempt to travel to the Swedish protecting power office unescorted.

U.S. citizens contemplating visiting North Korea are encouraged to register in person, by telephone or fax with the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, China, prior to entering the DPRK. The American Citizen Services Unit of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing is located at: Number 2 Xiushui Dong Jie, Beijing, China 100600; Telephone: (86-10) 6532-3431, ext. 5344, 5648 or 5028. Fax: (86-10) 6532-4153.

After hours please call (86-10) 6532-1910 and ask for the Embassy duty officer. Americans who wish to contact U.S. consular officials in China may also e-mail questions to: www.amcitbeijing@state.gov. It is also possible to register from the United States via the Internet through the U.S. Embassy's home page at http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn.