GIBBONS V. OGDEN,

GIBBONS V. OGDEN, 9 Wheaton 1 (1824), a Supreme Court case that, for the first time since ratification of the U. S. Constitution, explicated the meaning of Article I, section 8, which gave Congress the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Before the case was decided, it was common for states to legislate in matters that touched on commerce between states, and it was not clear whether navigation or transportation should be deemed "commerce." Chief Justice John Marshall, in one of his most famous decisions, made a powerful statement of the scope of Congress's power. In language that would be quoted countless times in future Supreme Court opinions, he insisted that it was wrong to "contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the Constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument." Marshall went on to state: "All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce' to comprehend navigation. …The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming it."

The dispute in the case was whether the New York legislature's grant of an exclusive monopoly to operate steamboats to Aaron Ogden could prevail over a federal law, under the authority of which Thomas Gibbons was running steamboats in competition with those of Ogden. Marshall held that the New York statute under which Ogden sought to exclude competition from Gibbons was an unconstitutional infringement of interstate commerce. Finding that a federal statute had provisions that applied to steamboats, Marshall declared New York's legislation granting Gibbons an exclusive license to operate steamboats barred. Marshall's opinion in Gibbons left open the question of the extent to which states could regulate interstate commerce if Congress had failed to act, and this became an important issue in future commerce clause litigation. Marshall's expansive reading in Gibbons, however, and his rejection of "strict construction" was frequently invoked in the late twentieth century to permit federal intrusion into many areas formerly regarded as the exclusive prerogative of state and local governments.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baxter, Maurice G. The Steamboat Monopoly: Gibbons v. Ogden, 1824. New York: Knopf, 1972.

Frankfurter, Felix. The Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney, and Waite. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1937.

Kmiec, Douglas W., and Stephen B. Presser. The American Constitutional Order: History, Cases, and Philosophy. Cincinnati: Anderson, 1998.