GULF WAR
On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded and conquered the neighboring state of Kuwait. President GEORGE H. W. BUSH announced U.S. policy regarding the invasion and marshaled diplomatic efforts focused in the UNITED NATIONS (UN) to oppose it. The UN Security Council quickly condemned the invasion, demanded that Iraq withdraw, and imposed mandatory economic and diplomatic sanctions to coerce Iraqi compliance with UN demands. Over the next four months the United States created and led a coalition of allied forces to counter the Iraqi aggression. In November 1990 the United States deployed over 500,000 troops, including naval and air forces, to Saudi Arabia and the adjacent region. On November 29, 1990 the UN Security Council issued an ultimatum to Iraq to withdraw, which Iraq did not heed. The U.S.-led coalition forces counterattacked starting on January 17, 1991 with air strikes. Ground operations began February 24, and within four days the Iraqi forces had been expelled from Kuwait.
The President formulated U.S. policy and conducted diplomacy, including voting in the UN Security Council, pursuant to his constitutional FOREIGN AFFAIRS powers. He imposed economic sanctions against Iraq pursuant to delegated LEGISLATIVE POWERS under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the UN Participation Act. The President deployed U.S. ARMED FORCES to the Gulf region on the basis of his foreign relations and COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF powers. Existing LEGISLATION authorized, and appropriated funds for, those forces. The President complied with the consultation and reporting requirements of the WAR POWERS ACTS.
Congress had adjourned after the invasion of Kuwait and after the initial deployment of U.S. forces. When Congress reconvened each house passed a resolution supporting the President's policy, and Congress provided supplemental funds for the armed forces. It also passed the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 approving economic sanctions. However, the major troop deployment was made after the mid-term election in November. At that time Congress had adjourned "sine die" and its leaders seemed reluctant to reconvene the session to consider the decision of
whether to continue to rely on economic sanctions to pressure Iraq to withdraw or to vote for war. Under pressure from public opinion, the press, and opponents of military action, however, the congressional leadership reconvened Congress and, after a thorough debate, Congress authorized U.S. participation in the war that was soon to follow. The President had steadfastly maintained that he had the requisite legal authority to use military force to expel Iraq from Kuwait on the basis of EXECUTIVE POWER. Nevertheless, after some discussion, Bush wrote the congressional leaders a letter requesting a JOINT RESOLUTION. As a result the claim of presidential WAR POWERS was not tested. In the end the President had ample legislative support for all the actions taken up to and including the war itself.
Congressional action in the Gulf War situation, coupled with its authorization of U.S. participation in the VIETNAM WAR, goes far toward diluting the importance of the KOREAN WAR precedent for supporting a presidential war power to initiate major military actions without specific congressional authorization.
Bibliography
GLENNON, MICHAEL J. 1991 The Gulf War and the Constitution. Foreign Affairs 70:84–101.
HENKIN, LOUIS;G LENNON, MICHAEL J.; and RODGERS, WILLIAM D., eds. 1990 Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution. Ardsley-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers.