NUCLEAR ENERGY (ISSUE)

In 1954 the U.S. government authorized private ownership of nuclear reactors as part of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's (1953–1961) Atoms for Peace initiative, paving the way for utility companies to build nuclear power plants. By the mid-1960s many utility companies had "gone nuclear," though building reactors proved far more costly than the early hopes; reactor energy did not meet expectations that they could provide power for pennies a day.

Most U.S. citizens' sole experience with the power of the atom was the devastating bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945; accordingly, some opposed the whole issue of nuclear energy. In California, after an earthquake disrupted construction, residents demanded the cancellation of the planned Bodega Bay reactor which was sited on a geological fault. Inhabitants of New York City resisted the siting of a plant within its borders because of the dense population.

Regardless of fears about nuclear weaponry, most people liked the idea of building atomic energy plants. The country was using increasing amounts of electrical energy (produced by burning fossil fuels which created air pollution. Nuclear power promised to be cheaper and cleaner. Moreover, nuclear power had the aura of a neat, high-tech solution to the complicated problems that people had come to expect from politics and business. When an oil embargo by countries in the Middle East hit in 1973–1974, the United States faced shortages of electricity, gasoline, and heating oil. Factories and schools were shut down. There were also cancellations of commercial airline flights, electrical brownouts, and increased lines at gasoline service stations. Blackouts plagued cities and industries, most spectacularly in New York City on July 13 and 14, 1977. High fuel prices reduced the productivity of U.S. industry. To all of these complaints the supporters of nuclear energy claimed a solution. They also argued that nuclear energy would solve the balance of payments problem and neutralize the damage to the international monetary system that was being done by the heavy U.S. imports of fuel.

To some U.S. citizens, atomic energy seemed to offer a way for the nation to achieve energy independence. Support for nuclear power steadily increased. Meanwhile the anti-nuclear movement carried forward the traditions of the anti-Vietnam War movement and many opponents initiated demonstrations at nuclear power plants. At Seabrook Station in New Hampshire, opponents staged sit-ins, civil disobedience, celebrity concerts, and rallies. Supporters of nuclear energy ridiculed the protesters' fear of technology and charged the anti-nuclear movement with a vaguely un-American variety of consumer elitism. One writer caricatured the protesters as "vegetarians in leather jackets who drive imported cars to Seabrook listening to the Grateful Dead on their Japanese tape decks amid a marijuana haze."

Regardless of this culture clash, the United States' energy crisis was real and was caused by several factors. One was that in the 1950s and 1960s strategic geopolitical concerns led the government to promote the import of fuel from overseas, especially from the Middle East. Another was that President Richard Nixon's (1969–1974) 1971 attempt to halt inflation (called the New Economic Policy) had imposed price controls on the entire economy. But when the other restrictions were lifted, oil remained regulated, keeping the price artificially low to consumers and increasing demand. The United States was extravagant in its use of energy—few U.S.-made cars got better than 10 miles to the gallon, and homes and businesses were poorly insulated and inefficiently designed. Diverse special interests had skewed portions of the government's oversight and regulation of the oil industry toward their particular interests, and passing general legislation regarding energy became a political nightmare. Accordingly, efforts to develop a consistent energy policy throughout the 1970s were diluted and diverted. The decade ended much as it began, with the United States wastefully consuming inordinate amounts of energy, subject, once again, to an oil crisis.

During the 1960s utility companies were aware of the coming energy shortage. One of their methods to prepare for the shortfall was to construct nuclear reactors. In January 1973 there were 27 functioning reactors in the United States, providing only five percent of the power generated. Fifty-five plants were under construction, and an additional 78 were in the planning stages. The majority, however, were never built. Security expenses, nuclear-waste disposal costs, and construction overruns made the return on investment slim in nuclear-power plants.

In 1974, seeking to assist the nuclear industry, the administration of President Gerald R. Ford (1974–1977) disbanded the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which had overseen U.S. nuclear development for 28 years. In its place were constructed two more industry-friendly commissions: the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). The latter agency was empowered to develop new energy sources and market U.S. nuclear industry abroad. The NRC streamlined the licensing and commission of reactor projects, but many of the old problems remained. Safety was a pressing issue: fires underscored the potential for a catastrophic accident at nuclear plants (at the Indian Point Two reactor in New York in 1971, the Zion reactor in Illinois in 1974, the Trojan reactor in Oregon in 1974, and the Brown's Ferry reactor in Alabama in 1975). In 1975 the Union of Concerned Scientists presented the White House with a petition signed by 2,000 scientists which called for a reduction in nuclear construction. Public opinion followed that of the scientists. Environmental groups increasingly challenged the construction of nuclear projects in the NRC and in the courts, delaying the deployment of projects and driving up the start-up costs. The 1978–1979 protests at the Seabrook nuclear power plant in New Hampshire were particularly vocal and drew national attention to the issue. Then, in the spring of 1979, an accident at the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Three Mile Island nuclear power plant resulted in a partial core meltdown. Although no one was injured, the accident terrified the public and placed the future of the nuclear industry in jeopardy.

On April 26, 1986, near the town of Pripyat in the Soviet Union, attention was again focused on the issue of safety in the nuclear power industry. One of four nuclear reactors at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station in the Ukraine exploded with such force that the roof of the building was completely blown off. Eight tons of radioactive materials were scattered about the region immediately surrounding the plant. Airborne radioactivity from the blast rained down on northern Europe and Scandinavia. Fallout contaminating farm produce was measured as far away as Scotland. Engineers at Chernobyl had accidentally initiated an uncontrolled chain reaction in the reactor's core during an unauthorized test in which they unlawfully incapacitated the reactor's emergency systems. In the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe, more than 30 people lost their lives. Moreover, one estimate placed the number at 20,000 who would eventually live shortened lives as a result of the effects of their exposure to radiation from the accident.

In the United States experts argued that the disaster at Chernobyl was not pertinent to the domestic nuclear industry. They noted that the technology employed at Chernobyl was not being used in the United States. The Soviets, they pointed out, were using a weapons-material production reactor to generate electricity for their domestic market—something not done in the United States. Furthermore, the Chernobyl reactor lacked a containment building—a required safety component mandated for all U.S. reactors. Nevertheless, many in the United States drew uneasy parallels between Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, among them, that operator error and equipment failure was possible in the nuclear industry. The consequences of a single major mistake could be catastrophic.

During the 1980s scores of "anti-nuke" organizations warned of the hazards of nuclear energy and protested plant construction and operation. In Seabrook, New Hampshire, protesters rallied around the citizens' action group, the Clamshell Alliance, to oppose the building of two nuclear reactors. By 1987 the utility that owned Seabrook was near bankruptcy, in part due to the increased vigilance of oversight safety committees insisted upon by the Clamshell Alliance. At Long Island's Shoreham nuclear facility the story was much the same. Besieged by civic-group opposition and having far exceeded initial cost estimates of $241 million (its actual cost to the utility had surpassed $5 billion), the Shoreham "nuke" was closed by the state government in 1988. The utility that owned Shoreham had failed to develop an adequate evacuation plan for the region of Long Island that would be affected in the event of a meltdown. Sold to the state government for one dollar, the completed plant was to be dismantled even before it opened.

Cost overruns and construction problems continued to plague the industry. Florida's St. Lucie Two plant cost about four times its original estimate of $360 million. This price, as it would turn out, was a relative bargain. By mid-decade Michigan's Midland nuclear power plant (initial cost estimate: $267 million) had cost the utility constructing it $4.4 billion, and it was nine years behind schedule. In the West, at the Diablo Canyon Plant, earthquake supports were installed backwards.

Another problem the industry faced was the disposal of irradiated fuel rods. During the 1980s utility companies stored these rods on site at the power plants, in large vats resembling swimming pools, but this was only considered a temporary solution. In 1982 Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The act called upon the Department of Energy (DOE) to find a suitable site to bury radioactive waste. DOE, however, was unsuccessful in locating a site that included both the necessary stable rock formation (free of groundwater) and the requisite local public support. By the end of the 1980s, no solution to the problem of nuclear waste had been found.

NUCLEAR ENERGY (ISSUE)

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